Short answer
Charter Article 48 and Directive (EU) 2016/343 require a natural person suspected or accused in criminal proceedings to be treated as innocent until guilt is proved according to law. The Directive applies from the moment the person is suspected or accused until the decision finally determining guilt becomes definitive.
Public authorities may identify a suspect and give strictly necessary, objective information about an investigation or a public-interest risk. They must not state or imply that the person is guilty. Courts may make pre-trial decisions based on suspicion or incriminating evidence, including detention decisions, but their reasoning must preserve the distinction between reasonable suspicion and established guilt. Physical restraints and presentation choices must be justified by case-specific security or procedural needs rather than used to portray guilt.
The Directive does not directly regulate independent journalism. Nevertheless, official leaks, prejudicial government statements and the conduct of courts remain attributable to public authorities, while the trial court must protect impartial adjudication against damaging publicity. Freedom of expression and media freedom under Charter Article 11 must be balanced with privacy, data protection, reputation and fair-trial rights.
Parallel regulatory proceedings do not automatically stop. If an administrative track is punitive in substance, Charter criminal-procedure protections can apply, including the right to silence. Authorities should distinguish an established regulatory infringement from unproved criminal guilt and coordinate compulsory questioning, publication and evidence use.
Scope and duration
Directive 2016/343 applies only to natural persons who are suspects or accused in criminal proceedings. It does not itself apply to legal persons, although Charter, ECHR and national-law protections may do so. It also does not convert every civil, disciplinary or administrative inquiry into a criminal proceeding.
Protection begins when a person is suspected or accused, regardless of domestic labels. It continues through investigation, trial and appeal until the determination is definitive. After acquittal or discontinuance, public decisions should not cast doubt on innocence without a lawful new basis.
The Directive establishes minimum rules. Article 48 of the Charter applies whenever a Member State is implementing EU law, and Article 52(3) makes the corresponding ECHR guarantee an interpretive minimum. National constitutions and procedural laws may provide broader protection.
Public authorities must speak in terms of suspicion
Article 4 prohibits public statements by public authorities and judicial decisions other than decisions on guilt from referring to an unconvicted person as guilty. The rule reaches police, prosecutors, ministers, regulators and other officials speaking in an official capacity. Courts and authorities should use accurate procedural language: “suspected,” “accused,” “alleged,” “charged” or “under investigation,” depending on the actual status.
The whole presentation matters. Adding “alleged” once does not cure an announcement of guilt. Authorities should separate neutral facts from contested allegations, identify the stage and reserve guilt for the court.
Strictly necessary information remains possible. Authorities may seek identification help, warn of danger or give an objective status update. Necessity governs both speaking and detail; an evidential narrative or confession extract merely satisfying curiosity is difficult to justify.
Authorities may explain an accusation; they may not announce guilt before it is proved. —
Prosecutorial acts intended to prove guilt—such as an indictment or submissions in court—are not prohibited simply because they assert the prosecution case. That exception does not turn every prosecutorial media statement into an act of proof. Outside the adjudicative process, the strict-necessity and no-prejudgment rules remain central.
Judicial decisions may discuss evidence without deciding guilt
Arrest, bail, detention, search, asset-freezing and other preliminary decisions often require a court to assess suspicion, evidential strength, risk or necessity. Article 4 expressly permits preliminary procedural decisions based on suspicion or incriminating evidence. The court need not write as if no evidence exists, but must not treat guilt as already settled.
In Milev, C-310/18 PPU, the Court of Justice held that continued pre-trial detention may rest on suspicion or incriminating evidence provided the decision does not refer to the detainee as guilty. Directive 2016/343 does not itself prescribe all substantive conditions for detention; national law, Charter Articles 6, 47 and 48, and the ECHR supply additional controls.
In AH and Others, C-377/18, a plea agreement for one accused person could necessarily mention alleged joint perpetrators tried separately. It had to make clear that their proceedings were separate and their guilt had not been legally established. Necessity and careful qualification, rather than deleting every reference to another suspect, governed the result.
The 2026 judgment in Kotaňák, C-748/24, confirms that an appeal court reviewing discontinuance may assess incriminating evidence and offence elements in detail even where the accused had not commented on all investigation evidence, provided the assessment does not express an opinion of guilt. If a higher court's binding rulings are incompatible with the presumption, EU primacy requires the lower court to disregard those rulings while carrying out lawful procedural directions.
This distinction should shape drafting. State the test, evidence and provisional conclusion needed for the decision; avoid categorical findings unnecessary to it. A later trial judge must remain free to assess all admissible evidence after adversarial argument.
Physical presentation can communicate guilt
Article 5 requires appropriate measures so suspects are not presented as guilty in court or public through physical restraint. Handcuffs, glass boxes, cages, prison clothing or heavy visible security can influence observers before evidence is heard.
Restraint may be justified by security, escape, third-party contact or self-harm risks. Authorities should document an individual assessment, use the least prejudicial effective measure and, where feasible, shield restraint from cameras or the fact-finder. A blanket policy is insufficient.
Media coverage requires a different legal analysis
Directive Article 4 addresses statements by public authorities, not independent reporting by private media. Charter Article 11 protects expression and media freedom. Courts should not treat unfavourable coverage itself as an official breach.
The State nevertheless remains responsible for its own contribution and for ensuring a fair tribunal. Investigators should control unauthorised disclosure; officials should not anonymously supply prejudicial material that they could not publish openly. Judges should assess whether publicity creates a concrete impartiality risk and use lawful measures such as reasoned directions, juror screening where applicable, adjournment, venue safeguards or enforcement of confidentiality. Restrictions on reporting must themselves be lawful, necessary and proportionate.
Accurate reporting can serve open justice. Problems arise where coverage collapses allegation into guilt, publishes unlawful leaks, pressures witnesses or makes adjudication appear predetermined. Privacy, data-protection, defamation or procedural remedies must be balanced against Article 11.
Burden of proof, silence and evidence
Article 6 places the burden of proving guilt on the prosecution and requires doubt to benefit the accused, without preventing a court's lawful fact-finding powers. Presumptions of fact or law must remain within reasonable limits, be proportionate and preserve defence rights. An irrebuttable presumption that effectively requires the accused to prove innocence is incompatible with the core guarantee.
Articles 7 and 10 protect silence and the privilege against self-incrimination. Exercising those rights must not be used as evidence that the person committed the offence. Authorities may still obtain material that exists independently of the suspect's will through lawful powers, including documents under a valid production duty, breath, blood, tissue or biometric samples, subject to other safeguards.
The Directive does not harmonise every rule on admissibility. National evidence rules apply subject to effectiveness, equivalence, Charter fairness and an effective remedy for breach. A public-reference violation does not automatically dictate one universal remedy, but courts must be able to stop, correct or compensate the breach and protect the overall proceeding.
Parallel administrative proceedings
Tax, market-abuse, competition, professional, employment and sector-regulatory inquiries may run beside a criminal case. The first task is to determine whether the administrative procedure or sanction is “criminal” in substance under EU fundamental-rights standards, considering legal classification, the nature of the offence and the severity and purpose of the penalty.
In DB v Consob, C-481/19, the Grand Chamber held that a natural person could not be penalised for refusing to answer a market-abuse authority's questions where the answers could establish liability for a criminal offence or an offence punishable by administrative sanctions of a criminal nature. The right does not justify every failure to cooperate or a refusal to provide pre-existing material, but it constrains compelled testimonial self-incrimination.
A regulator cannot evade criminal-procedure safeguards merely by calling a punitive proceeding administrative. —
A regulator may publish a final administrative finding within its mandate, but should not present an individual as criminally guilty before the criminal court decides. Authorities should map compelled evidence, onward disclosure, access rights, timing, publicity, duplicate penalties and ne bis in idem. A stay is not automatic; it depends on the applicable EU and national rules and concrete prejudice.
Practical controls
Official communications should identify authority, stage, purpose and necessary facts. Pre-trial decisions should separate suspicion from guilt. Media plans should address leaks and visual presentation. Parallel-proceeding protocols should identify compulsion, evidence flows and potentially criminal sanctions.
If a breach occurs, act promptly: correct the statement, remove unnecessary material, preserve the original publication, assess recusal or trial-protection measures, and provide access to an effective remedy. Delay can allow prejudgment to become irreversible.
Conclusion
The presumption of innocence regulates more than the final verdict. It controls how public officials speak, how courts justify preliminary measures, how suspects appear in public and how punitive regulatory questioning interacts with criminal exposure. Objective information and provisional evidential assessment remain possible, but authorities must preserve the visible and legal distinction between accusation and guilt until a final lawful determination.
Sources
This article provides general legal information, not advice for a specific matter. Laws, facts and procedural deadlines may change the result. Follow the linked primary sources and obtain local advice before acting.